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Abstract
We record the existence of an availability heuristic that is reflected in
disaster myopia of U.S. investors and exists prior to the attacks of 9/11.
We argue that this is fueled by an aggregate experience hypothesis
effect, resulting in a pronounced increase in the sensitivity of U.S.
stock prices to terrorist attacks on foreign soil. After 9/11, stock prices
react proportionally to the size of an attack and the share of FDI stock
held in the region by the sector in which firms operate. This effect,
non-existent prior to 2002, has become increasingly strong in recent
years.
JEL classification: F14; G14; G15.
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1 Introduction
In an efficient market, equity prices reflect the sum of expected future
discounted cash flows. In this paper, we examine events that investors may
consider to result in sudden drops in these expected cash flows. However,
the events that we study take place on foreign soil, vary greatly in their
magnitude and frequency, and assessing their expected impact on cash flows
requires knowledge of the capital stocks that generate these cash flows.
The investor who can easily bring to mind relevant adverse instances is
more likely to sell, thereby contributing to a drop in equity prices. However,
some events are easier to recall than others: the availability heuristic (Tversky
and Kahneman, 1973) tells us that these events are often also judged to be
more common. At the same time, the experience hypothesis (Malmendier
and Nagel, 2011) states that whereas investors may have a short memory,
they are much more likely to remember extreme events, and therefore more
likely to act on this salient news (Klibanoff et al., 1998; Hirshleifer and Teoh,
2003).
Recently, Berger et al. (2013) have found that U.S. multinational firms
benefited from increased exports and share prices (Dube et al., 2011), through
covert CIA interventions. Whereas these interventions were extreme in na-
ture, they were generally regarded as positive for the firms involved. In
this paper, we investigate whether the reverse holds, and if hostile extreme
events lead to a drop in share prices of the firms involved. More specifically,
we demonstrate how the experience hypothesis has, for a prolonged time,
fueled the effects of the availability heuristic by examining the impact of ter-
rorism on foreign soil on U.S. stock prices. In a fast-moving world with an
abundance of news, are investors able to take these events into account? Do
equity prices drop as a result? And is the drop proportional to the expected
loss in cash flows for U.S. investors?
We show that for the past several years, equity prices indeed drop after a
large terrorist attack, and that the drop is commensurate to the capital stock
built by U.S. firms in the region where the attack takes place. In sum, we
find that nowadays U.S. investors behave as would be expected. But we also
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show that in order for investors to act this way, the ‘message’ unfortunately
has had to hit home first. The relationship between large terrorist attacks,
the stock of foreign direct investment built up by U.S. firms in the region
and share prices on the New York Stock Exchange is only significant, both
statistically and economically, after the tragic events of September 11, 2001.
How different then is the world, since 9/11? We find that the incidence of
a terrorist attack in a region did not change materially after 9/11, while media
coverage in the U.S. of attacks on foreign soil initially increased, but has since
leveled out. Nonetheless, the relationship between terrorist attacks, FDI and
share prices remained significant even with reduced coverage of these attacks.
We argue therefore that 9/11 was the experience that created awareness
among investors about the potential impact of terrorist attacks, and, in line
with the experience hypothesis and the salience of terrorism, explains the
change in investor behavior afterwards. As a result, we conclude that 9/11
appears to have fueled the availability heuristic, since U.S. investors have
become more sensitive to terrorist attacks on foreign soil after 9/11.
We analyze 16,728 terrorist attacks that occurred in 144 countries on
4,009 days between 1998 and 2010. Out of a total of 3,270 trading days on
the NYSE in our sample, there are 2,868 days during which information on
terrorism can enter the market. Given the abundance of terrorist attacks,
we cannot identify abnormal returns using standard event study methods.
Instead, we measure abnormal returns using a jump-diffusion model that
allows for volatility clustering in stock returns (Maheu and McCurdy, 2004).
After establishing that terrorist attacks on foreign soil can have an effect on
stock prices, we condition this effect on the share of total foreign FDI stock of
the sector that a firm belongs to. Finally, in order to test the aggregate effect
of the experience hypothesis, we examine this effect both before (1998-2000)
and after (2002-2006) the 9/11 attacks, as well as during the recent crisis
(2007-2010).
We observe that the stock market reaction to terrorist attacks is, as ex-
pected, highly nonlinear, with only the largest attacks having a material
effect. The extent to which these large attacks affect share prices depends
on the foreign presence of American firms. Firms build foreign direct invest-
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ment stocks in order to enhance productivity and create shareholder value
(Harris and Ravenscraft, 1991; Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Javorcik, 2004),
and terrorist attacks that occur close to these stocks threaten to destroy part
of that value. We find indeed that the stock market effect of terrorist attacks
on foreign soil is proportional to the share of investment of a sector on that
soil. But we also find that this stock market effect is not apparent prior to
2002 and has become increasingly strong since the 9/11 attacks.
Our paper is related to Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), who found that
stocks of Spanish firms with large parts of their business in the Basque coun-
try outperformed their counterparts during a truce period, only to under-
perform when the truce ended. We also build on Drakos (2010a), who has
found that countries with a strong trade relation with Spain and the United
Kingdom experienced more pronounced abnormal stock market losses during
the attacks in Madrid and London. In this paper, we look at this relation-
ship on a larger scale, taking into account many more instances of terrorism
and their connection with FDI in Western Europe, the rest of Europe, Latin
America, Africa, the Middle East and Asia, both before and after 9/11.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief
introduction, while Sections 3 and 4 describe our data and methodology
respectively. In Section 5 we present the results of the analysis before con-
cluding briefly in Section 6.
2 Stock Prices, Terrorist Attacks and FDI Stocks
The tragic events on September 11, 2001 were the worst attacks on Amer-
ican soil in 70 years and hit the United States in its financial and political
center. The loss of lives and material damage sustained during the attacks
displayed the economic consequences of terror, and the ensuing shock waves
were felt around the world.
Stock market data, due to their forward looking nature and high fre-
quency, have often been used to assess the economic impact of terrorism.
Following 9/11, financial markets in America and around the world showed
heavy losses as they incorporated the news of these attacks. Previous research
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has shown that stock markets in countries suffering from terrorism exhibit
negative abnormal returns as a result of this type of aggression. Findings
indicate that stock markets show negative abnormal returns during and af-
ter large isolated attacks like the 9/11, Madrid or London attacks (see e.g.
Drakos, 2004; Carter and Simkins, 2004; Maillet and Michel, 2005). How-
ever, liquid and well diversified markets can absorb these shocks, such that
the impact of the effect is instantaneous or in some cases hardly noticeable
(Johnston and Nedelescu, 2006; Mende, 2006). When taking into account
a larger set of attacks, negative abnormal returns are also found (Drakos,
2010b), accompanied by an increase in stock market variance (Peren Arin
et al., 2008). In an increasingly interconnected world, what remains unclear
is how terrorism in different geopolitical regions has spilled over to U.S. mar-
kets.
Terrorist attacks on foreign soil can affect U.S. stock prices in a number
of ways. First, if investors experience higher risk aversion as a result of a
terrorist attack, this increases the rate at which they discount future cash
flows. In this case we expect to see a uniform price shock occurring across
assets/sectors that share a common discount factor. However, there is ample
evidence that sectors in the same country (or similar sectors across countries)
exhibit different reactions to the same attack (see amongst others Chen and
Siems, 2004; Straetmans et al., 2008; Berrebi and Klor, 2010; Chesney et al.,
2011), making it unlikely that discount rate changes explain the price shocks
we observe after terrorist attacks.
Second, an attack can influence expected future cash flows, either via
an increase in expected costs or a decrease in expected revenues. In both
cases, the loss in realized cash flows depends on the location of an attack,
the amount of capital goods present in the location and the level of dam-
age to these productive assets.1 The damage, in turn, is determined by
the magnitude of an attack and specific factors such as population density,
building codes and the quality of infrastructure. Do FDI stocks adjust as a
result of terrorist attacks? Enders et al. (2006) and Abadie and Gardeazabal
1These assets can be both physical capital and human capital, although share prices
react more to attacks on the latter (Karolyi and Martell, 2010).
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(2008) find that in an open economy, country-specific terrorism risk can lead
to movements in capital (FDI) to other countries. Others find that terror-
ism has an impact on determinants of FDI, like growth and consumption
(Blomberg et al., 2004; Eckstein and Tsiddon, 2004). Conversely, Enders
et al. (2006) find that the presence of U.S. FDI in a country does not lead to
increases in terrorist attacks.
There is also the possibility of a third effect, since the expected loss as a
result of a terrorist attack depends on investors’ assessment of the probability
of an attack and the losses generated by that attack. Crucial in this assess-
ment is how investors generate expectations: the availability heuristic can
make it difficult for investors to properly incorporate all possible outcomes,
thereby resulting in biased expectations. The fact that attacks take place on
foreign soil does not make things easier: although investors seem remarkably
apt at identifying and valuing different forms of FDI (Doukas and Travlos,
1988; Chen et al., 2000), the fact that the cumulative effect of terrorism on
the stock of FDI is quite small, totaling less than 1 percent of the total stock
(Enders et al., 2006), may make it easy to overlook.
3 Data
To analyze how terrorism on foreign soil affects U.S. stock prices, we
combine data from three different sources. We first describe the database on
terrorist attacks, followed by data on FDI stocks and stock market data of
American multinational companies.
3.1 Terrorist Attacks
We collect data on terrorist attacks from the Global Terrorism Database
(GTD), developed and maintained by the University of Maryland. The GTD
contains information on over 98,000 international attacks between 1970 and
2010.2 For an event to be incorporated in the GTD, it has to be intentional,
2For more information on the GTD see LaFree and Dugan (2007).
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violent and carried out by non-state actors.3 We further limit our sample
by only including successful attacks, that were considered to be terrorism
beyond any doubt by the GTD.4 Information on these additional filters is only
available from 1998 onwards, leaving us with 16,287 attacks that take place
in 144 countries on 4,009 days between 1998 and 2010. Although the number
of attacks seems high, it includes both incidents of national and transnational
terrorism and is in line with other papers (e.g., Piazza, 2008). Attacks that
occur during weekends and holidays are placed on the next available day that
the U.S. stock market can react to the attack. Out of a total 3,270 trading
days in our sample, there are 2,868 during which information on terrorism
can enter the market. We discuss the consequences of this high frequency of
events for our analysis in Section 4.
In order to differentiate between the magnitude and geographical location
of an act of terror, we construct a daily terrorism intensity index (Eckstein
and Tsiddon, 2004; Peren Arin et al., 2008), such that
TERi,t = ln(1 + # attacksi,t + # fatalitiesi,t + # injuredi,t), (1)
where i represents the region the attack took place in and t is the day on
which the attack is placed. The inputs are the number of attacks, fatalities
and injuries as reported by the GTD.5 The regions closely follow the grouping
3According to the GTD, terrorist attacks have to be aimed at ‘attaining a political,
economic, religious, or social goal,’ there must be ‘evidence of an intention to coerce,
intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the
immediate victims,’ and the event must be ‘outside the context of legitimate warfare
activities’ (Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2011).
4Users of the GTD can further govern the parameters of their search results by em-
ploying an additional filter. The existence of a ‘Doubt Terrorism Proper?’ field records
reservation, in the eyes of GTD analysts, that the incident in question is truly terror-
ism. Such uncertainty, however, was not deemed to be sufficient to disqualify the incident
from inclusion into the GTD. Furthermore, such a determination of doubt is subsequently
coded by GTD analysts as conforming to one of four possible alternative designations: 1)
Insurgency/Guerilla Action; 2) Internecine Conflict Action; 3) Mass Murder; or 4) Purely
Criminal Act. Note that the ‘Doubt Terrorism Proper’ determination was only made for
incidents that occurred after 1997.
5For the purpose of this paper, including the intensity of media coverage in the U.S.
is also a possibility, although unfortunately the GTD reports at most their top 3 sources
for the information on the attack.
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of outward FDI at our disposal and are Western Europe (comprising the Eu-
ropean Union, Norway and Switzerland), the Rest of Europe, Latin America,
Africa, the Middle East and Asia & the Pacific.
The terrorism index TERi,t has several attractive features. A trading
day on which no terrorist attack occurs has a TER score of 0. Once attacks
occur, the TER score is additive in both the number of fatalities/injuries
and the number of attacks. For example, 1 attack with 10 injuries will not
have the same TER score as 10 separate attacks with 1 injured person each.
Whereas the former has a TER score of 2.6, the latter has a score of 3.
One downside of using the number of fatalities and injuries is that these
numbers are often not known on the day of the attack itself, but can take
weeks or even months to be confirmed. Even though estimated and official
death tolls can differ, we assume that the estimated death tolls are at least of
a similar magnitude as the official death toll. By using the log transformation,
we limit overestimation of the intensity score.6
Panel A in Table 1 shows summary statistics of the terrorism intensity
in each of the six regions. Asia & the Pacific have experienced the highest
intensity of terrorism, with an act of terrorism occurring on 2,086 out of 3,270
trading days in the sample period. This is followed by the Middle East and
Africa, which experienced acts of terrorism on 1,522 and 1,101 trading days,
respectively. On the contrary, these numbers are much lower for Western
Europe and Latin America, where attacks only occur on 640 and 500 trading
days respectively. Panel B summarizes the average number of fatalities and
wounded per attack, showing that terrorism was most lethal in Africa and
the Middle East. By comparison, attacks in Western Europe were the least
lethal.
[Insert Table 1 near here]
Important for our analysis is whether the incidence of terrorism has
changed since 9/11. In particular, are terrorist attacks more likely and have
6For example, in the weeks after the 9/11 attacks the death toll had been estimated to
be 6,000 over 4 attacks. This would have lead to a TER score of ln(1 + 4 + 6, 000) = 8.7.
The official death toll recorded in the GTD is 2,996 (including 19 terrorists), which leads
to a TER score of ln(1 + 4 + 2, 996) = 8.0.
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they increased in severity? To answer these questions, we plot the distri-
bution of the terrorism index for each of the regions, before and after 9/11,
in Figure 1. Overall, the distributions have not changed significantly since
9/11. The average value for the index is in fact lower in Western Europe, the
Rest of Europe, Latin America and Africa after 9/11. On the other hand, the
average value of the index is somewhat higher in the Middle East and Asia
& Pacific as there were more and larger attacks. However, extreme attacks
occur in all regions both before and after 9/11.
[Insert Figure 1 near here]
3.2 FDI Stocks
For the purpose of our analysis, we need accurate information on the as-
sets ‘at stake’: FDI stock built by U.S. firms in different parts of the world.
For reasons of confidentiality, such information is typically not available at
the firm level. What is available from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA) is the yearly stock of outward U.S. FDI per region and per indus-
try, published in the ‘Survey of Current Business’. The BEA covers most
industries and countries, although not all combinations are reported if the
amounts are negligible or if they would threaten to disclose data of individual
companies. We use data for the period 1998 to 2010.
Industries are classified by the BEA using either the Standard Industry
Classification (SIC) or the North American Industry Classification System
(NAICS). In order to link these FDI data to stock market data, we obtain
prices of the S&P500 and its sub-sector indices from Datastream. Since
the latter are classified using the Global Industry Classification Standard
(GICS), we need a mapping from SIC/NAICS to GICS, which to the best of
our knowledge does not yet exist. Therefore, we obtain a list of all current
and historic S&P500 companies with their SIC/NAICS and GICS codes from
Compustat in order to make a conversion table. More details on the data
and the conversion are provided in Appendix B. In our analysis, sectors
are defined according to the two-digit GICS codes and consist of Energy,
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Materials, Industrials, Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Health
Care, Financials, Information Technology, Telecommunication Services and
Utilities. For the Utilities sector, data on outward FDI were not available
after 2002 and it is therefore excluded from the analysis.
Figure 2 shows per sector the average share of U.S. outward FDI that
each region received from firms in that sector during the sample period 1998-
2010. We see that Western Europe, Latin America and Asia & the Pacific
all received large shares of U.S. investments. The main beneficiary of U.S.
outward FDI was Western Europe, whose countries received between 50 and
70 percent of all U.S. investments made abroad. The share of Western Eu-
rope was lowest in the Energy sector, where investments were more equally
distributed between the Middle East, Latin America and Asia & the Pacific.
When looking at Asia & the Pacific, we see that they received their highest
investment share from the IT and Industrial sectors. Moreover, outside the
Energy sector, the shares of Africa and the Rest of Europe were generally
quite low and averaged 0.6 percent and 1.5 percent, respectively.
[Insert Figure 2 near here]
4 Methodology
Our analysis consists of three steps. In the first step, we propose a solu-
tion for the fact that terrorist attacks occur so often that we cannot make
use of a standard event study methodology, since it is very difficult to con-
struct a proper event window. In the second step, we relate share prices to
terrorist attacks, allowing for the fact that investors’ response may be highly
non-linear, as they only respond to attacks that are severe enough to pos-
sibly cause (future) cash flow drops. For that reason, we limit ourselves to
investors’ ‘pure’ response to terrorism in this step, and do not yet incorporate
the role of FDI stocks. After all, an average attack may not have much of
an effect, regardless of the FDI stock present. Finally, in the third step, we
relate investor responses to large attacks with FDI stocks in different regions,
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taking into account the fact that this relationship may vary for reasons other
than the share of total FDI each region receives.
4.1 First step: jumps in the price process
To identify the effect of an event like a terrorist attack, we need to separate
the normal behavior of returns from abnormal behavior. The abundance of
terrorist events around the globe make nearly it impossible to find enough
estimation windows with (presumably) normal returns. As this is likely to
lead to biased estimates of abnormal returns when using standard event study
techniques (see e.g., Craig MacKinlay, 1997), we resort to a different method.
Since terrorist attacks are typically construed to be unexpected events,
we expect them to cause jumps in the price process.7 For this reason, we
rely on a jump-diffusion model to distinguish between attacks that have an
impact (i.e., where a jump occurred) compared to those that do not (i.e.,
no jump observed). Jump-diffusion models hail back to Merton (1976), but
while most of them combine a standard Brownian motion with a jump process
(see e.g. Naik, 1993), we rely on a simplified GARCH-jump model proposed
by Maheu and McCurdy (2004). The main advantage of this approach is
that we can capture volatility clusters in a GARCH framework, something
that a constant variance Brownian motion cannot do. As a result, large price
changes that occur due to volatility clustering are not erroneously classified as
a jump. By using this methodology, we assume implicitly that the impact of
terrorism abroad will directly impact the share price in the U.S., disregarding
any possible contagion effects from foreign markets to home markets (see e.g.
Dungey et al., 2005; Bekaert et al., 2011). However, since we deal with many
terrorist events, which tend to be absorbed quickly in liquid markets like the
U.S. (Johnston and Nedelescu, 2006; Mende, 2006), we choose to look only
at event days instead of possible contagion following attacks.
In order to measure jumps, we first define the standard return process.
Next, we define jumps and apply a filtering procedure to separate standard
7This at least holds for most of the market participants. Insider trading as reported
by Poteshman (2006) should not play an important role.
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price movements from jumps using a maximum likelihood estimator. Finally,
we extract the probability of a jump as well as its (expected) impact on the
price.
We start by describing the return process, which is defined as:
rt = µ+ φrt−1 + t (2a)
t = 1,t + 2,t, (2b)
where rt is the asset return, µ is a constant mean and φ an autoregressive
component.8 The composite error term, t, consists of 1,t and 2,t, innova-
tions by the GARCH and the jump process respectively. What allows us to
separate 1,t from 2,t is the fact each has a different distribution, as a result
of which we can decompose t.
We begin with 1,t, which follows a standard GARCH(1,1) process:
1,t ∼ N(0, σ2t ) (3a)
σ2t = ω + α
2
t−1 + βσ
2
t−1. (3b)
In contrast, 2,t represents the impact of jumps in the returns, which is as-
sumed to arrive via a Poisson process with time-varying intensity:
2,t = Jt − E[Jt|Φt−1], (4)
where Jt is the actual jump contribution and E[Jt|Φt−1] is its expectation
conditional on the previous days’ returns, Φt−1 = {r1, . . . , rt−1}. The jump
contribution Jt is the sum of the stochastic number of jumps, nt, where the
size of each jump Yt,k is assumed to be independently drawn from a normal
8Adding more variables to the mean equation is possible, however our explanatory
variables are indices and thus already quite broad. For example, it would not make sense
to estimate a market model in this case. We have performed robustness tests where the
Fama-French HML and SMB (Fama and French, 1992, 1993) factors have been included
in the mean equation, but this does not change the results of the analysis. Results are
available upon request.
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distribution with mean θ and variance δ2:
Jt =
nt∑
k=1
Yt,k, Yt,k ∼ N(θ, δ2). (5)
Finally, the probability that nt = j jumps take place on day t given the
history of returns Φt−1 is:
P (nt = j|Φt−1) = exp(−λt)λ
j
t
j!
, (6)
where λt is the jump intensity. Maheu and McCurdy (2004) suggest to let
the jump intensity follow an AR(1) process, where the expected number
of jumps today depend on yesterday’s expected number of jumps and the
jump intensity residual ξt−1 (the deviation of the number of jumps from its
expectation):
λt = E[nt|Φt−1] = λ0 + ρE[nt−1|Φt−2] + γξt−1 (7)
We use the filter procedure proposed by Maheu and McCurdy (2004) and
obtain the probability that at least one jump occurred based on the ex post
estimation of the number of jumps:
P (nt ≥ 1|Φt) = 1− P (nt = 0|Φt) (8)
and the ex-post assessment of the number of jumps that occurred on each
trading day:
E[nt|Φt] =
∞∑
j=0
jP (nt = j|Φt) (9)
Since the jump sizes are i.i.d and thus unconditional, multiplying the ex-
pected number of jumps with the average jump size yields the ex-post ex-
pected jump contribution E[Jt|Φt] = θE[nt|Φt]. Together, these two elements
tell us both how likely it is a jump occurred, as well as its size. Table 2 shows
summary statistics for these two variables, based on the estimations in Ta-
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ble A.1 in Appendix A.9
[Insert Table 2 near here]
The sectors with the highest jump probabilities are Health Care (35.1
percent), Consumer Discretionary (33.8 percent) and Financials (30.2 per-
cent). In contrast, sectors with the lowest average jump probabilities are
Utilities (13.5 percent) and Energy (19.2 percent). Panel B summarizes the
jump contributions, and shows that while Health Care has the highest aver-
age jump probability, its largest jump contribution was only -3.6 percent.10
The largest contribution of jumps to the Financials sector was -10 percent on
August 31st, 1998, the 7th largest one-day loss on the S&P500. Sectors that
have experienced both high jump probabilities and high jump contributions
are Consumer Discretionary, IT and Financials.
Now that we have a measure for the likelihood and magnitude of jumps,
the next question is to what extent terrorist attacks are responsible for these
jumps. To investigate the relationship between terrorism, jumps and FDI,
we opt for a two-stage analysis. In the first stage, we estimate per sector the
relationship between the TER index and the likelihood and size of jumps.
Using this estimation, we predict the average reaction to a large attack in each
of the regions. In a second stage, we regress the predicted jump probabilities
and sizes on the share of outward U.S. FDI that regions received in order to
test our hypothesis.
While we sacrifice some efficiency in our estimations by opting for this
two-stage analysis, there are three important benefits to our approach. First,
we consider the possibility that only the largest attacks evoke a reaction on
financial markets. A single-stage analysis, with an interaction between the
TER measure and FDI, would at best capture the effects of an average
attack, conditional on the average FDI stock, and may thus fail to capture
the conditions under which we expect to see a reaction.
9The estimations show that θ is negative for all indices, indicating that jumps are on
average negative. Since we multiply the expected number of jumps with the average jump
size to obtain the expected jump contributions, this means that these are always negative.
10This occurred on October 15th, 2008 when the S&P500 lost 9.5 percent for its second
biggest one-day loss ever.
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Second, we may fail to properly estimate the impact of terrorism condi-
tional on FDI stock if the latter is endogenous. Indeed, Enders et al. (2006)
and Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008) find evidence that FDI flows out of a
country as a result of terrorism. By identifying the relationship between ter-
rorism, FDI stocks and share prices in two steps, we are able to avoid this
problem of endogeneity.
The final reason is related to the measure of outward FDI. The data
obtained from the U.S. BEA are recorded in dollar amounts on a historical
cost basis, and thus rise on average every year. When FDI in regions grows
at more or less the same rate, only the dollar amount invested will be higher,
even though the amount invested in each region remains proportionally the
same. If large attacks occur later in the sample period, we might (falsely)
conclude that more FDI in a region leads to a higher reaction by using dollar
amounts. To counter this problem, we propose to calculate shares of outward
FDI per region. Unfortunately, regardless of this transformation, a one-
step analysis will suffer from severe multicollinearity when using either dollar
amounts or relative shares. For instance, when dollar amounts grow every
year this implies a positive correlation, whereas the correlation between FDI
shares is negative by design: if one region receives a larger share, other
regions will lose some of theirs. Splitting up the identification strategy in
two steps avoids this problem. We choose to work with relative shares in
FDI, since they are more stable over time than the dollar amounts, even
though they still exhibit some variability over time. For example 12 percent
of the investments made by the Telecom sector in 1998 were located in Asia
& the Pacific, while this increased to 26 percent by 2010. Investments made
by the Energy sector in Western Europe were 46 percent of the total FDI in
1998, but fell to 22 percent by 2010.
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4.2 Second step: nonlinear reactions to terrorist attacks
To assess the impact of terrorist attacks on jump probabilities and jump
sizes, we start by estimating:
P (nt ≥ 1|Φt) = α +
6∑
k=1
β1,kTERk,t +
6∑
k=1
β2,kTER
2
k,t + γMonth + τDoW + υt (10a)
E[Jt|Φt] = α +
6∑
k=1
β1,kTERk,t +
6∑
k=1
β2,kTER
2
k,t + γMonth + τDoW + νt
(10b)
where P (nt ≥ 1|Φt) and E[Jt|Φt] are the jump probability and jump contri-
bution respectively, TERk,t is the daily terrorism intensity score in each of
the k defined regions and Month and DoW are controls for month and day-of-
the-week effects. In order to obtain yearly estimates of the jump probability
and jump size due to terrorism, we run this regression separately for each
sector i in each year.
Since P (nt ≥ 1|Φt) is a probability and has values in the set [0, 1],
we estimate Equation (10a) using a fractional logit approach (Papke and
Wooldridge, 1996), obtaining:
E [P (nt ≥ 1|Φt) | x] = Λ
(
α +
6∑
k=1
β1,kTERk,t +
6∑
k=1
β2,kTER
2
k,t + γMonth + τDoW
)
, (11)
where Λ is the logistic function and Equation (11) is estimated using a
Bernoulli log-likelihood function. The fitted probabilities of jumps associ-
ated with large terrorist attacks, ηi,k,t will now be correctly predicted in the
[0, 1] range.
Furthermore, as E[Jt|Φt] is always negative, with values ranging between
(−∞, 0], we estimate Equation (10b) using a Tobit model with a censoring
from above at 0:
E[Jt|Φt] =
E[Jt|Φt]∗ if E[Jt|Φt]∗ < 00 if E[Jt|Φt]∗ ≥ 0 . (12)
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The fitted values for the jump size now fall correctly in the range (−∞, 0].
Of course, our objective in the end is to identify investors’ reactions to
events that may affect (future) cash flows. As a result, we are particularly
interested in large attacks that take place in regions where a considerable
FDI stock has been built up. But what is a large attack? And are there
large attacks in all regions? Do investors react? And is this reaction the
same over time?
To answer these questions, we show fitted univariate quadratic plots be-
tween the S&P500 jump probabilities and regional TER scores in Figure 3.
Our objective is to find out whether there is a threshold value beyond which
attacks provoke jumps. As expected, most of the patterns displayed in Fig-
ure 3 demonstrate a non-linear relationship, where the probability of a jump
increases disproportionately with the intensity of a terrorist attack. An ex-
ception is the Middle East, where more severe attacks seem to provoke smaller
reactions. At first glance this may seem odd, however given the ongoing con-
flict between Israel and its occupied territories, combined with the invasion
and U.S. military presence in Iraq, it could be possible that markets have be-
come desensitized to attacks in this region. Figure A.1 in Appendix A shows
the relationship for the Middle East when attacks in these countries are not
used to calculate the terrorism intensity score. Compared to Figure 3(e), we
see that the relationship between terrorism and stock market sensitivity is
less downward sloping and statistically insignificant without these areas.
[Insert Figure 3 near here]
From Table 1 and Figure 3, we observe two things. First, the average
maximum TER score per region is approximately 7.11 Second, although the
confidence intervals are quite wide due to a limited amount of large attacks,
a magnitude 7 attack results in a jump probability above 50 in 4 out of the
6 regions. We use this as a threshold value and condition the probability of
a jump, in any given year, on the occurrence of a hypothetical attack with
magnitude 7, although we use other values as a robustness check. In order
11This corresponds to one large attack with 1,100 injuries and fatalities or for example
10 attacks with an average of 100 injuries and fatalities.
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to allow the reaction to this attack to vary over time, we estimate Equations
(10a) and (10b) year-by-year. Given each year’s and each sector’s estimation,
the share price reaction for each sector i to a large terrorist attacks is then:
ηi,k,t = E [(P (nt ≥ 1|Φt) | TERk = 7] (13a)
ζi,k,t = E [E[Jt|Φt]∗ | E[Jt|Φt] < 0 , TERk = 7] , (13b)
where ηi,k,t/ζi,k,t is the estimated probability/size of the jump in the share
price of sector i associated with a large terrorist attack in region k in year t.
Of course, in years without large attacks, the estimated relationship between
terrorism and jump probabilities/sizes is expected to be relatively flat, and
predicting the conditional mean given an attack outside of the observed range
of actual attacks will likely yield a low jump probability/size.
As a robustness test, we will also estimate Equations (10a) and (10b) on
the entire sample instead of yearly subsamples. Since every region suffers
from at least one large attack (as can be seen in Figure 3 and Table 1), these
estimations have an improved fit. However, this comes at a cost as we have
to use average shares of FDI over the entire sample period, thereby ignoring
year-to-year changes.
4.3 Third step: linking reactions to large attacks with
FDI
Having established what constitute terrorism effectuated jumps, the final
step is to analyze to what extent the likelihood and size of these jumps are
related to the U.S. FDI stock that has been built up in a region. We therefore
estimate:
ηi,k,t = α + βFDIi,k,t + µi + νYear + υi,t (14a)
ζi,k,t = α + βFDIi,k,t + µi + νYear + νi,t, (14b)
where ηi,k,t and ζi,k,t are the predicted jump probability and size of sector
i associated with attacks in region k occurring in year t respectively, and
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FDIi,k,t is the share of the total FDI stock of sector i that it has invested in
region k in year t. Moreover, µi and Year are sector and year fixed effects
respectively, and are included to control for heterogeneity between sectors
and years.12 If investors take into account the investment position of firms
in each sector, we expect β to be positive for ηi,k,t and negative for ζi,k,t. In
that case, a higher share of FDI in a region will lead to a higher probability
of a jump due to a large scale attack and a more negative movement in share
prices.
Since ηi,k,t and ζi,k,t are predicted values of P (nt ≥ 1|Φt) and E[Jt|Φt],
we again need to take into account their supports. For Equation (14a), we
include sector fixed effects and again estimate a fractional logit.13 Estimating
Equation (14b) using a Tobit approach is less straightforward, as Greene
(2004) cautions that adding fixed effects biases the variance of the error
term. To still account for unobserved heterogeneity due to the panel nature
of the data, we estimate Equation (14b) using a random effects Tobit model
with sector-specific random effects (see e.g. Maddala, 1987).
Given the data at our disposal, one side note is in order here. The identi-
fication strategy we follow relies on the assumption that terrorism and sector
level investment are, more or less, uniformly distributed across countries in
the region. Since we lump together the region’s investments, we allow prices
to be influenced by attacks in other countries, to which a sector might not
be exposed to. In this case, unless investors perceive it as a sign of regional
instability, we would not expect to see a reaction on the share price as their
FDI stock is not ‘at stake’. In this scenario, the potential impact would be
underestimated, as we compute the average reaction to attacks in the region
without being able to make the distinction whether the sector is exposed to
only one particular country, or a little bit to all of them. Should we still see
a reaction, even though we aggregate on a region and sector level, it would
12We do not include region fixed effects as these will absorb the cross-variation of shares
between regions that we are interested in.
13Papke and Wooldridge (2008) caution adding fixed effects when T is small and N is
large. The likelihood ratio test however shows that the unobserved heterogeneity does not
play a large role and the estimates are similar to a pooled version of the model. Moreover,
similar to Hausman and Leonard (1997), N is fixed in our case, combined with T = 13
years.
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be indicative of the relative strength of these results.
5 Results
In this section, we retrace the steps we described above. We start by
establishing whether investors react to large terrorist attacks. Then we re-
late these reactions to FDI stocks. Subsequently, we investigate whether
investors’ reaction to terrorism on foreign soil is proportional to U.S. FDI
stocks in the area where the attack takes place, whether the reaction is dif-
ferent after 9/11, and if the information that investors receive has changed
due to 9/11. We conclude this section with some robustness checks.
5.1 Are investors alert to large terrorist attacks on for-
eign soil?
Does a large terrorist attack on foreign soil increase the probability of a
drop in U.S. share prices? And how large is the expected drop in share prices?
In order to answer these questions, Table 3 contains the jump probabilities
and jump sizes, conditional on a large attack, as defined by Equations (11)
and (12).
[Insert Table 3 near here]
We observe that, during the entire sample, the region where large at-
tacks lead to the highest average predicted jump probability and jump size
is Western Europe. On average, the probability that at least one jump oc-
curred in one of the sectors due to a large terrorist attack is 49.90 percent,
and the average size of that jump is -2.33 percent. Other regions where at-
tacks lead to noticeable reactions on U.S. stock markets are Latin America
and Asia & the Pacific, where the average ηi,k,t are 38.77 percent and 32.94
percent respectively. The average predicted jump sizes are -1.00 percent for
Latin America and -0.76 percent for Asia & the Pacific respectively, and are
markedly lower than for Western Europe.
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To analyze how much the TER terms add to the prediction, we perform a
Shapley decomposition, which is based on the pseudo-R2 of each regression,
and is shown in Table 3. On average, around 10% of the predictive power
in the regression comes from the combined TER terms, although for certain
year/sector combinations this is as high as 29% for ηi,t,k and 39% for ζi,t,k.
Of course, since large terrorist attacks are, fortunately, still rare, share
prices are not always expected to jump. For instance, in 2006 our model
predicts a jump probability for Western Europe’s Industrials sector equal to
0 percent, whereas in 2009 the jump probability for the same sector was 12.5
percent, although the actual terrorist activity in the region in those years
was low and quite similar.14
5.2 Is investors’ reaction to large attacks proportional
to the FDI stock that is ‘at stake’?
Now that we have established investors’ average reaction to large terrorist
attacks, the next question is whether this reaction depends on the FDI stock
built up by U.S. firms in the region where a large attack takes places. To
answer that question, we regress the jump probabilities and jump sizes on
FDI stocks. We expect that jump probabilities increase with larger FDI
stocks, and we expect to see larger negative jumps as FDI stocks increase.
Indeed, this is what we observe from Table 4. The coefficients on the share
of received FDI are significant and as expected: higher shares of outward U.S.
FDI in a region lead to higher jump probabilities and larger negative jump
sizes in response to high TER attacks.15
14The highest daily TER scores for Western Europe in 2006 and 2009 are 2.64 and 2.48
respectively.
15Year and sector fixed effects are included in the fractional logit case, and only year
controls in the random effects Tobit case. The sector fixed effects are found to be jointly
insignificant in the fractional logit estimation, meaning that the estimates are similar
to a pooled version of the model. For the random effects Tobit model, the unobserved
heterogeneity in ζi,k,t does not play a large role as the random sector effect contributes
only 9 percent of total variance. However, a likelihood ratio test comparing the random
effects with a pooled version shows that the random effect is significantly different from
zero.
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[Insert Table 4 near here]
Since the interpretation of the magnitude of the coefficients in Table 4 is
not straightforward due to the nonlinear nature of the models, we plot the
relationship between FDI stocks and jump probabilities/sizes in Figure 4.
We observe that the probability of a jump increases from the unconditional
expected value of 30 percent when no investments take place, to 70 percent
when a region receives all sector level FDI. The size of the jump due to large
terrorist attacks also increases with received FDI, leading to a stock market
reaction of -3 percent if a region receives all FDI from that sector. The
highest share a region received is found in 2006 when the Telecom sector
had 70 percent of its FDI stock invested in Western Europe. Using these
estimates, a large attack in that year would have led to a drop of -2.5 percent
in its share price, with a 60 percent probability of a jump.
[Insert Figure 4 near here]
These results show that the presence of American firms in regions suffering
from terrorism directly affects their share prices. The higher the proportion
of investments made in a region, the more the share prices of these sectors
react to large terrorist attacks taking place there. This suggests that investors
do on average take into account the investment positions of firms belonging
to a sector and adjust expectations on cash flows when they are dealt with
the negative exposure of terrorism.
5.3 Has 9/11 made investors more alert to what is ‘at
stake’?
To what extent do our results so far reflect the post 9/11 state of the
world? In order to find out, we split our sample and compare the relationship
between investors’ reaction and U.S. FDI stock before and after 9/11, as well
during the recent financial crisis.
Table 5 shows the results for each of these periods, relating jump proba-
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bilities and jump sizes conditional on large terrorist attacks to FDI stocks.16
We observe that FDI stocks had no relation to jumps prior to 9/11. Af-
ter 9/11, higher FDI stocks resulted in higher jump probabilities and more
negative jumps, as expected.
[Insert Table 5 near here]
According to the availability heuristic, an explanation of our findings so
far would be that 9/11 has made it easier for U.S. investors to bring to mind
terrorist attacks, including those that take place on foreign soil. Given the
nature of 9/11, it is appealing to interpret our results in this manner. But
the lack of comprehensive information on the true impact, in terms of cash
flow losses, of the terrorist attacks we study makes it difficult to distinguish
this explanation from another one: that investors overreact after 9/11 and
engage in a blind fire sale after large terrorist attacks on foreign soil.
In Figure 5, we explore two aspects of our results that suggest the latter
has not happened. The first aspect concerns the role of what is ‘at stake’:
if investors’ reaction post-9/11 is the result of panic, we expect it to be less
sensitive to the U.S. FDI stock in a region where an attack takes place. If,
however, investors’ reaction post 9/11 reflects the availability heuristic, we
expect sensitivity to have increased. Indeed, in Figure 5, we observe that the
latter is the case both for jump probabilities (comparing 5(a) and 5(b)) and
for jump sizes (comparing 5(d) and 5(e)).
The second aspect concerns whether investors are indeed ‘on alert’ after
9/11: if their reaction post-9/11 is the result of panic, we expect it to de-
crease over time and become less sensitive to the U.S. FDI stock. Should the
investors’ reaction post-9/11 reflect the availability heuristic fueled by the
experience of 9/11, we expect sensitivity to increase over time, due to large
terrorist attacks in regions where a lot of FDI stock has been built up (e.g.,
Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005). Indeed, in Figure 5, we observe that
the latter is the case both for jump probabilities (comparing 5(b) and 5(c))
and for jump sizes (comparing 5(e) and 5(f)).
16The jump probability estimates are, however, still based on the entire sample.
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[Insert Figure 5 near here]
Between 2002 and 2006, the slope shifts and we see a gradual increase
in stock market reaction to attacks in high FDI regions. The effect of FDI
becomes even more apparent in the last subsample. In both periods after
9/11, the relationship is statistically significant. In the second subsample, a
sector investing all of its FDI in a region under attack experiences on average
a jump of -3 percent with a probability of 60 percent. In the last subsample,
this same sector would see a near-certain jump of -5.5 percent in its share
price.17
Now that we have shown that investors appear to place more emphasis
on what is ‘at stake’, we have not necessarily proven the importance of the
experience hypothesis in sustaining the availability heuristic. After all, the
world has changed in more ways than one following 9/11. Firstly, Straetmans
et al. (2008) find that stock markets have structurally changed after the 9/11
attacks, and point out that this might be caused by the perceived risk of new
attacks. Secondly, in the period after 9/11, the U.S. commenced the War-on-
Terror and invaded Afghanistan and Iraq, as a response to which terrorists
attacked public transportation in Madrid (2004) and London (2005). These
experiences showed that Western Europe, beneficiary of the bulk of U.S. FDI,
could also be subject to terrorist attacks. Finally, with the developed world
suffering from the declining U.S. housing market, more focus was placed on
emerging markets as a source of growth and profit. However, while investors
and companies shifted more of their investments to regions like Asia and
the Middle East, these regions also saw the bulk of terrorist attacks (see
Table 1).18
17Since year fixed effects are included in Equations (14b) and (14b), we control for the
fact that the estimated of jump probabilities and sizes might be higher due to the financial
crisis.
18United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (2011) reports
that in 2011 52 percent of the world FDI inflows occurred in Developing and Transition
Economies, up from 33 percent in 2007. Based on the UNCTAD database on FDI stock,
the share of these markets in the total world FDI stock increased from 29 percent in 2007
to 35 percent in 2010.
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5.4 Are investors able to assess the probability and fre-
quency of large attacks?
Both arguments given so far in favor of the availability heuristic do not
tell the full story. In order to establish that 9/11 has indeed had the effect
of waking up investors to the impact of terrorism on foreign soil, then (a)
the probability and frequency of large terrorist attacks before 9/11 should
not be zero, and (b) investors should have been able to be obtain accurate
information about these probabilities and frequencies.
In Figure 6(a), we show the frequency of attacks in each region during
the sample. Although some regions see an increase (Asia & Pacific and
the Middle East), in most regions the annual number of attacks does not
change after 9/11. Moreover, the relative frequencies in Figure 6(a) do not
change materially once we start excluding smaller attacks. It appears that
the events that investors are expected to consider materialize over the entire
sample period.
[Insert Figure 6 near here]
In Figure 6(b), we proxy the amount of reporting in the U.S. on terrorism
on foreign soil by plotting the yearly number of articles that appeared in the
Wall Street Journal for searches on ‘terrorism’ or ‘terrorist’ and each of the
regions identified in our analysis. As expected, we see a coverage spike follow-
ing the 9/11 attacks, driven mainly by articles relating to terrorism and the
Europe, Asia and Middle East regions. Prior to 9/11 (1998-2000), there are
an average of 3 articles a year on terrorism in these three regions, increasing
to 65 articles in the 5 years following the attacks. However, the overall trend
is downwards and, with the exception of the Middle East, seems to be leveling
out around 2006. Of course, these numbers have to be interpreted with some
care: the number of articles depend positively on the occurrence of large
attacks, and not every article could give investors accurate information on
the probability of a terrorist attack occurring. Nonetheless, based on these
figures, we can conclude that the relationship between price jumps, terrorism
and FDI stocks remained significant and became stronger, even though the
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media coverage of terrorism was lower compared to the years following 9/11.
Moreover, as Melnick and Eldor (2010) have shown, the economic impact
of terrorist attacks attributable to media coverage diminishes over time, in-
dicating that the news-value for investors at the end of the sample period
is potentially lower than right after the attacks. Taken together, we view
this as evidence in favor of the experience hypothesis fueling the availability
heuristic: the reaction stays significant for a long time after 9/11, even as
coverage of terrorism abroad levels out.
5.5 Robustness
In the previous sections we have provided evidence that a terrorist at-
tack at home can act as a wake up call to investors, making them aware
of attacks elsewhere and thereby correcting the way they evaluate the fre-
quency and probability of terrorist attacks. Moreover, we have argued that
this phenomenon is not driven by an overreaction of investors to attacks,
but is rational since it is proportional to the FDI stock ‘at stake’. Here, we
examine the robustness of these results.
From Figure 5 we have seen that the relationship between stock market
jumps and large terrorist attacks in regions receiving more U.S. FDI has be-
come economically and statistically significant after 9/11. Following attacks
in Western Europe, the largest receiver of U.S. FDI, we find that the re-
lationship intensifies even more and is strongest during the last subsample.
The fact that large jumps were more prevalent during the financial crisis is
controlled for using time fixed effects. Even so, estimating the last subsample
without the turbulent year 2008 does not change our results.19
Another test is to what extent our findings in Figure 5 are the result of the
fact that we estimate Equations (10a) and (10b) for each year, rather than
for our entire sample. In order to find out, we re-estimate them using the
entire sample and adding year fixed effects. As we already concluded from
Table 1, all regions have seen at least one large attack and by using these
19See Table A.2 in Appendix A for the estimations. The coefficients are actually larger
in size when estimating without the year 2008.
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estimations we therefore avoid having to predict the average reaction to large
attacks when they do not occur in a given year. The downside of this strategy
is that we are forced to use average shares of outward FDI, disregarding their
yearly variability. In Appendix A, Table A.3 shows the estimation results,
while Figure A.2 displays the impact of an increase in FDI stock on the jump
probabilities and jump sizes for the whole sample. In Figure 7 we show the
pooled estimation on each of the subsamples. The results are in line with
what we have found so far. In fact, if anything, we find that although the
average jumps are somewhat smaller, the changes in jump probabilities after
9/11 are more remarkable, especially in the last subsample. It appears that
the impact of 9/11 has indeed lasted for a long time.
[Insert Figure 7 near here]
How relevant is the size of a terrorist attack? Is it the case that the large
attacks are what drives investors’ reactions? In order to find out, we check
whether conditioning the yearly jump forecasts on smaller attacks changes
our conclusion. Table A.4 in Appendix A shows the regression results for
levels of TER = 1, TER = 3, TER = 5, baseline specification TER = 7
and TER = 9, while Figure 8 plots the jump probabilities and jump sizes
for increasingly large attacks. When terrorist attacks are of a small size, the
sector indices do not move and the reaction is very small, even if a sector
would make its investments in one single region. As terrorist attacks become
increasingly large, the share prices react more to attacks in regions receiving
more FDI. For extreme terrorism of TER = 9, sectors investing all of their
FDI in one region would experience a jump of -5.2 percent with a probability
of 72 percent. The exercise shows that this relationship only exists for the
largest of observed attacks. In Table 1 we saw that the mean TER scores lie
between 0.23 and 1.74. If we had estimated on these mean values, we would
be unable to see the reaction both in terms of jump probability and in jump
size.
[Insert Figure 8 near here]
Finally, we check whether the results are driven by the large attacks in
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London (2004) and Madrid (2005), as Western Europe received the bulk of
U.S. outward FDI. Similarly, a country like China receives a lot of FDI,
but there are only 21 attack days recorded in the GTD during the sample
period. We ran the analysis by excluding the London and Madrid attacks, as
well as a separate analysis without China. When excluding the London and
Madrid attacks the results become somewhat weaker, whereas they become
stronger without China. However, in both cases the relationship between FDI
and the reaction to large terrorist attacks is still negative and statistically
significant.20
6 Conclusion
We have examined how terrorism in different geopolitical regions of the
world has spilled over to U.S. financial markets through the foreign presence
of American firms, and how this relationship has changed after 9/11. We
document that share prices react negatively to large terrorist attacks on for-
eign soil, and that this reaction is proportional to the FDI stock of U.S. firms
on that soil. However, in order for investors to act this way, the ‘message’
unfortunately has had to hit home first: the relationship is only significant,
both statistically and economically, after the tragic events of September 11,
2001, indicating disaster myopia consistent with the availability heuristic.
However, given that the frequency of attacks has not changed materially af-
ter 9/11, the relationship between share prices, FDI and terrorist attacks
abroad has stayed strong even as the media coverage of these attacks has
come down from its peak levels post-9/11. Presented with this evidence, we
conclude that 9/11 was the experience that created awareness of the potential
impact of terrorist attacks among investors, and, in line with the experience
hypothesis, explains the change in their behavior afterwards.
The results in this paper are in line with a growing literature (see e.g.
Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Drakos, 2010a) that find that the (global)
activity of firms and/or sectors leads to sensitivity in their share prices as a
20Results are available on request.
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reaction to acts of terrorism. In an increasingly globalized world, this has
an impact on both companies and investors. On the one hand, investors
need to take into account the geopolitical situation in regions where firms
locate their FDI before they invest in this company. On the other hand,
multinationals valuing the stability of their share price also need to take this
into account before investing in these regions. The documented relationship
between foreign presence of firms, terrorism and their share price is likely
to become even more important in the coming years: American firms have
increasingly built up their presence in Asia and the Middle East, yet these
regions have seen the bulk of terrorist attacks since 1998, and are likely to
continue to pose a geopolitical risk in the near future. A better understanding
of sensitivity to terrorism, preferably using firm level investment positions,
is therefore a promising avenue for future research.
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Figure 1: Terrorism before and after 9/11
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The graphs show the distribution (as a kernel density plot) of the terrorism index, before
and after the 9/11 attacks. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for differences in the distribution
among days on which attacks take place indicate that only for Africa and the Middle East
there is a change after 9/11.
Figure 2: U.S. Direct Investment - Sector Distribution Geographical Areas
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The figure shows the geographical distribution in outward FDI of nine S&P500 sectors.
To calculate shares, data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis are transformed
from NAICS/SIC to GICS sectors (see Appendix B) and averaged over the sample period
1998–2010.
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Figure 3: S&P500 reaction to terrorism
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The graphs show the relationship between the intensity of terrorism in different regions
of the world and probabilities that the S&P500 experienced a jump on these attack days.
Fitted values and their 95 percent confidence intervals are presented, as well as the density
of the TER scores.
Figure 4: Are share price reactions proportional to FDI stock ‘at stake’?
(a) Jump probability ηi,k,t
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The graphs show the jump probability and size in reaction to a large terrorist attack in
a region, depending on the share of FDI this region receives. Fitted values and their 95
percent confidence intervals are shown over the response surface for the regressions in
Equations (14a) and (14b), and Table 4.
34
Figure 5: Changes in sensitivity of investors after 9/11
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The graphs show for different subsamples the jump probability and size in reaction to
a large terrorist attack in a region, depending on the share of FDI this region receives.
Fitted values and their 95 percent confidence intervals are shown over the response surface
for the regressions in Equations (14a) and (14b) and Table 5.
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Figure 6: Exposure to terrorism on foreign soil
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Figure (a) shows the annual frequency of attacks in each of the regions. Figure (b) shows
the number of Wall Street Journal articles per year for a Boolean search on ‘(terrorism
OR terrorist) AND X’, where X is each of the regions. The search is conducted using the
Lexis-Nexis newspaper database. Since the region ‘Rest of Europe’ is not properly defined
outside the context of this study, we group it together with ‘Western Europe’ in one large
‘Europe’ region.
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Terrorism
A. TER-scores B. Attacks
Trading days Average Average
Region Mean Std. Dev. Max. with attack Deaths Wounded
Western Europe 0.23 0.58 7.60 640 0.43 3.90
Rest of Europe 0.42 0.93 6.98 762 2.43 5.80
Latin America 0.26 0.73 5.73 500 2.44 3.36
Africa 0.74 1.22 8.37 1,101 5.34 7.11
Middle East 1.31 1.72 6.90 1,522 4.66 11.05
Asia & the Pacific 1.74 1.63 7.57 2,086 2.77 6.16
The table displays summary statistics of attacks in different global regions selected from
the Global Terrorism Database over the period 1998–2010, spanning a total of 3,270 trading
days. Panel A shows the statistics of the TER scores calculated from these attacks, where
‘Trading days with attacks’ counts the number of days in the sample where a terrorist
attack took place. Panel B shows the average number of fatalities and wounded per
attack using the raw data from the Global Terrorism Database. For instance, the Madrid
bombings are included as four separate attacks having injured 450 people each.
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Figure 7: Reaction to terrorism and share of FDI - Pooled Estimation -
Split Sample
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The graphs show for a pooled version of the model, the jump probability and size in
reaction to a large terrorist attack in a region during different subsamples, depending
on the share of FDI this region receives in this subsample. Fitted values and their 95
percent confidence intervals are shown over the response surface for the regressions in
Equations 14a and 14b, and Table A.3.
Figure 8: Reaction to terrorism and share of FDI - Variable TER
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The graphs show the jump probability and size in reaction to different-sized attacks in
each region, depending on the share of FDI this region receives. Fitted values over the
response surface of the regressions in Equations (14a) and (14b), and Table A.4 are shown.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics (in percent)
A. Jump probability B. Jump contribution
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
S&P500 36.9 36.7 0.0 100 -0.7 1.2 -10.0 0.0
C. Discretionary 33.8 34.3 0.0 100 -0.7 1.2 -11.2 0.0
C. Staples 28.7 28.2 1.9 100 -0.2 0.3 -3.3 0.0
Energy 19.2 27.3 0.0 100 -0.5 1.1 -14.3 0.0
Financials 30.2 34.3 0.0 100 -0.7 1.3 -10.8 0.0
Health Care 35.1 29.9 2.8 100 -0.3 0.4 -3.6 0.0
Industrials 28.9 34.3 0.0 100 -0.7 1.3 -11.6 0.0
IT 28.5 34.0 0.0 100 -0.9 1.6 -12.5 0.0
Materials 28.8 28.0 2.3 100 -0.3 0.5 -5.1 0.0
Telecom 27.4 27.8 1.2 100 -0.2 0.3 -2.5 0.0
Utilities 13.5 24.1 0.0 100 -0.3 0.7 -11.6 0.0
The table displays summary statistics of the output from the GARCH-Jump model for the
S&P500 and its sectors. Panel A shows the probability that at least one jump occurred
on a trading day, P (nt ≥ 1|Φt). Panel B displays the jump contributions, calculated as
the expected number of jumps on day t, E[nt|Φt], multiplied with the average jump size
θ.
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Table 3: Average reactions to a large terrorist attack
A. Jump probability ηi,k,t B. Jump size ζi,k,t
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Western Europe 49.90 40.99 0.00 100.00 -2.33 4.05 -16.64 0.00
Rest of Europe 30.45 33.39 0.00 100.00 -0.76 1.20 -4.83 0.00
Latin America 38.77 36.13 0.00 100.00 -1.00 1.44 -7.90 0.00
Africa 28.59 22.61 0.08 89.32 -0.48 0.58 -2.97 -0.01
Middle East 30.55 24.58 0.00 96.66 -0.73 1.43 -11.60 0.00
Asia & the Pacific 32.94 22.24 0.04 89.96 -0.67 0.84 -6.68 -0.01
Contribution TER (in %) 10.91 5.69 3.10 29.78 10.22 6.19 2.30 39.81
The table displays summary statistics for the predicted jump probabilities (Panel A) and
predicted jump sizes (Panel B) associated with a large attack in each of the regions. The
probabilities and sizes are averaged out over year and sector. A large terrorist attack is
defined as having a TER score of 7, which corresponds to 1,100 injuries and fatalities.
The predictions are obtained by estimating Equations (11) and (12) on a year and sector
basis. A Shapley decomposition of McFadden’s pseudo-R2 is performed to determine the
contribution of the combined TER terms .
Table 4: Share price reactions and FDI stock
Jump probability ηi,k,t Jump size ζi,k,t
α -0.917*** -1.235***
(0.229) (0.307)
FDIi,k,t 1.723*** -2.539***
(0.270) (0.331)
Year FE Included Included
Sector FE Included
N 696 696
L -325.27 -1380.07
ρ 0.09
LR Test 1 48.88***
LR Test 2 1.59
The table shows panel regression results for Equations (14a) and (14b), where reactions of
sectors to large terrorist attacks in regions are regressed on the share of FDI they receive.
ηi,k,t is estimated using fractional logit, whereas ζi,k,t is estimated using a random effects
Tobit model. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and are robust for ηi,k,t . *
significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. L is the
log likelihood value, ρ is the fraction of variance due to the unobserved heterogeneity µi
and is defined as σ
2
µ
σ2µ+σ
2

. LR Test 1 is a likelihood ratio test of σµ = 0 in ζi,k,t. LR Test 2
is a likelihood ratio test for the joint significance of the sector fixed effects in ηi,k,t.
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Table 5: The impact of 9/11 on investors’ reaction
A. Jump probability ηi,k,t B. Jump size ζi,k,t
Before 9/11 After 9/11 Before 9/11 After 9/11
1998 - 2001 2002 - 2006 2007 - 2010 1998 - 2001 2002 - 2006 2007 - 2010
mean 0.336 0.306 0.427 -0.742 -0.816 -1.489
(std. dev.) (0.273) (0.306) (0.354) (1.374) (2.072) (2.467)
α -0.966*** -1.625*** -1.296*** -0.666*** 0.120 -0.867**
(0.294) (0.343) (0.301) (0.257) (0.276) (0.411)
FDIi,k,t 0.537 1.439*** 3.532*** -0.356 -2.449*** -4.745***
(0.443) (0.428) (0.536) (0.428) (0.526) (0.688)
Year FE Included Included Included Included Included Included
Sector FE Included Included Included
N 210 270 216 210 270 216
L -99.31 -118.03 -99.77 -348.15 -536.27 -460.52
ρ 0.17 0.04 0.15
LR Test 1 22.51** 3.10*** 20.56***
LR Test 2 5.41 1.37 3.40
The table shows panel regression results of Equations (14a) and (14b) for different sub-
samples, where reactions of sectors to large terrorist attacks in regions are regressed on
the share of FDI they receive. ηi,k,t is estimated using fractional logit, whereas ζi,k,t is
estimated using a random effects Tobit model. Standard errors are reported in parenthe-
ses, and are robust for ηi,k,t . * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; ***
significant at 1 percent. L is the log likelihood value, ρ is the fraction of variance due to
the unobserved heterogeneity µi and is defined as
σ2µ
σ2µ+σ
2

. LR Test 1 is a likelihood ratio
test of σµ = 0 in ζi,k,t. LR Test 2 is a likelihood ratio test for the joint significance of the
sector fixed effects in ηi,k,t.
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Appendix A
A.1 GARCH-Jump estimates
Estimates of the model for the S&P500 and sector indices are shown
in Table A.1. The results show that the estimated average return, µ, is
not significantly different from zero and is in line with the actual average
return in the sample period. The main coefficients of interest are those
that govern the jump dynamics. The autoregressive coefficient in the jump
intensity equation, ρ, is close to 1 for all indices, indicating that the jump
intensity and jump probabilities advance smoothly over time. It also indicates
that, like volatility, jumps exhibit clustering. A likelihood ratio test, testing
if ρ = γ = 0, shows that the null hypothesis that the jump intensity is
time-invariant can be rejected.21 The average jump size, θ, is negative and
significant for all indices ranging between -0.4 percent (Telecom) and -1.7
percent (Energy). The unconditional expected level of jumps, Eλt, shows
that jumps are more likely to occur during our sample period compared to
the more stable indices chosen by Maheu and McCurdy. The difference is
due to higher estimates of autoregression in the jump intensity, ρ, and the
jump intensity constant, λ0. One of the reasons we find a higher expected
jump intensity could be that Maheu and McCurdy use an estimation window
between 15 and 40 years up to the end of 2001, while our estimation period
is thirteen years in which there were three distinct crises (the 1998 crisis, the
crash of the internet bubble and the recent financial crisis). Finally, Maheu
and McCurdy suggest that the effect of jumps on returns is best measured
by the unconditional variance of jump innovations, which is reported in the
last row of Table A.1. This average variance due to jumps is highest for the
Financials, Energy and IT indices.
21The constraint is similar to λt = λ.
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A.2 Additional Figures and Tables
Figure A.1: S&P500 reaction to terrorism in the Middle East - Excluding
attacks in Iraq, Israel and occupied territories
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The graph shows the relationship between the intensity of terrorism in the Middle-East
– excluding Iraq, Israel and the occupied territories – and probabilities that the S&P500
experiences a jump on these attack days. Fitted values and their 95 percent confidence
intervals are shown for a univariate quadratic regression of the S&P500 jump probabilities
on the TER score for days where attacks took place in this region.
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Figure A.2: Reaction to terrorism and share of FDI - Pooled Estimation
(a) Predictive Margins η
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The graphs show for a pooled version of the model, the jump probability and size in
reaction to a large terrorist attack in a region, depending on the share of FDI this re-
gion receives. Fitted values and their 95 percent confidence intervals are shown over the
response surface for the regressions in Equations (14a) and (14b) and Table A.3.
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Table A.2: Investors’ reaction conditional on FDI stock in 2006-2010,
excluding 2008
Jump probability ηi,k,t Jump size ζi,k,t
mean 0.365 -1.159
(std. dev.) (0.349) (2.363)
α -1.657*** -0.829**
(0.353) (0.358)
FDIi,k,t 4.120*** -4.973***
(0.608) (0.816)
N 162 162
L -72.20 -345.30
ρ 0.06
LR Test 1 3.53***
LR Test 2 1.45
The table shows the panel regression of Equations (14a) and (14b) without 2008. Reactions
of sectors to large terrorist attacks in regions are regressed on the share of FDI they receive.
ηi,k,t is estimated using fractional logit, whereas ζi,k,t is estimated using a random effects
Tobit model. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and are robust for ηi,k,t . *
significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. L is the
log likelihood value, ρ is the fraction of variance due to the unobserved heterogeneity µi
and is defined as σ
2
µ
σ2µ+σ
2

. LR Test 1 is a likelihood ratio test of σµ = 0 in ζi,k,t. LR Test 2
is a likelihood ratio test for the joint significance of the sector fixed effects in ηi,k,t.
45
Table A.3: Regression output - Pooled Estimation
A. Jump probability η¯i,k B. Jump size ζ¯i,k
1998 - 2010 1998 - 2001 2002 - 2006 2007 - 2010 1998 - 2010 1998 - 2001 2002 - 2006 2007 - 2010
mean 0.342 0.365 0.277 0.438 -0.699 -0.662 -0.557 -1.556
(std. dev.) (0.153) (0.177) (0.193) (0.306) (0.436) (0.583) (0.494) (2.049)
α -0.931*** -0.796*** -1.152*** -0.988** -0.575*** -0.550*** -0.459*** -0.625*
(0.145) (0.220) (0.428) (0.430) (0.123) (0.151) (0.108) (0.365)
FDI i,k 2.622*** 1.305*** 2.524*** 5.138*** -0.744*** -0.675** -0.587** -5.587***
(0.240) (0.301) (0.349) (0.750) (0.136) (0.273) (0.278) (1.058)
Sector FE Included Included Included Included
N 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54
L -22.31 -23.73 -21.55 -23.29 -2.76 -35.28 -33.46 -103.71
ρ 0.76 0.51 0.26 0.18
LR Test 1 50.48*** 20.40** 5.95** 3.18***
LR Test 2 0.18 1.53 0.49 0.00
The table shows the pooled regression of Equations (14a) and (14b) on different subsam-
ples. Reactions of sectors to large terrorist attacks in regions are regressed on the share of
FDI they receive. η¯i,k is estimated using fractional logit, whereas ζ¯i,k is estimated using a
random effects Tobit model. Standard errors are in parentheses, and are robust for η¯i,k.
* significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. L is
the log likelihood value, ρ is the fraction of variance due to the unobserved heterogeneity
µi and is defined as
σ2µ
σ2µ+σ
2

. LR Test 1 is a likelihood ratio test of σµ = 0 in ζ¯i,k. LR Test
2 is a likelihood ratio test for the joint significance of the sector fixed effects in η¯i,k.
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Appendix B Industry Classifications and For-
eign Direct Investment
The data on the investment position of U.S. sectors were obtained from
the website of the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis in the section ‘Position
on a historical-cost basis, country detail by selected industry’ and include all
countries in which there is direct investment.
Industries are classified using the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
prior to 1999 and according to the North American Industry Classification
System (NAICS) thereafter. The industries for which data are publicly avail-
able and their respective SIC/NAICS codes are shown in Table B.1.
Table B.1: Industry Classifications
Industry name SIC Industry name NAICS
Oil and gas extraction Mining 21
+ Petroleum and coal products 13 + 29 Utilities 22
Manufacturing, of which Manufacturing, of which:
Food and kindred products 20 Food 311
Chemicals and allied products 28 Chemical 325
Primary and fabricated metal industries 33-34 Primary and fabricated metal products 331-332
Industrial machinery and equipment 35 Machinery 333
Electronic and other electric equipment 36 Computers and electronic products 334
Transportation equipment 37 Electrical equipment, appliances, and components 335
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 39 Transportation equipment 336
Miscellaneous 339
Wholesale trade 50-51 Wholesale trade 42
Information 51
Depository institutions 60 Depository institutions 60
Financial, insurance, and real estate industries 61-67 Finance and insurance 52
Services 70-89 Professional, scientific, and technical services 54
Holding companies (nonbank) 55
Other n.a. Other n.a.
The table displays the two industry classification available from the U.S. Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis data on outward FDI of U.S. multinational firms. Prior to 1999, the data
are classified using SIC, afterwards they are recorded using NAICS.
The BEA also provides a category Other Industries, which combines all
remaining industries. Since this category can not be mapped into a series of
SIC or NAICS codes we are forced to exclude it. Another exclusion is the
Utilities category, as it is only available up until 2002. For regions where
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Miscellaneous Manufacturing is missing, we use the provided category Total
Manufacturing and subtract all the available separate manufacturing cate-
gories.
To match the SIC/NAICS data on investments to the GICS-based stock
market indices, we download all current and historic S&P500 companies
with their SIC/NAICS and GICS codes from Compustat. We tabulate the
SIC/NAICS classifications per 2 digit GICS code and obtain the mapping as
shown in Table B.2.
We observe from the mapping that the SIC/NAICS sectors do not cor-
respond one-to-one with their GICS counterparts. For example, firms that
are classified as Wholesale Trade appears in Consumer Staples, Health Care
and Materials. Another NAICS sector that appears in multiple GICS sectors
is Information, mapped into GICS counterparts IT, Telecom and Consumer
Discretionary.
Under the SIC classification, this sector was unavailable and therefore we
were not able to obtain an estimate of outward U.S. FDI for the Telecom
sector in 1998.
Outside of Telecom in 1998 and the non-availability of the Utilities sec-
tor, other GICS sectors do not suffer from this problem. Unfortunately
however, we do not have more disaggregate data at our disposal to map
the SIC/NAICS sectors more accurately to their GICS counterpart. The
‘Holding Companies (nonbank)’ and ‘Other’ categories do not lead to a clear
SIC/NAICS mapping and therefore have to be excluded, although they ac-
count for 37 percent of yearly U.S. outward FDI on average.
The BEA data is available on region and country level, with the limita-
tions that some country/industry/year combinations are not shown to avoid
disclosing data of a specific firm. Since combinations of industry/region/year
do not suffer from this limitation, we use the BEA regions Latin America,
Middle East, Africa and Asia & the Pacific. The European Union is also
reported and takes into account changes in the number of member states.
The Rest of Europe is then defined as the value of Europe minus the Eu-
ropean Union. Countries in the Rest of Europe are for example Albania,
Armenia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Norway, Russia, Serbia
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and Switzerland. Since Norway and Switzerland fit in better with E.U. coun-
tries, and outward FDI data is always available for both countries, we place
them together with the E.U. countries.
Table B.2: Mapping SIC/NAICS to GICS
GICS 1998 (SIC) 1999-2010 (NAICS)
10. Energy Oil and gas extraction
+ Petroleum and coal products (13 + 29) Mining (21),
Industrial machinery and equipment (35) Machinery (333)
15. Materials Chemicals and allied products (28), Primary and fabricated metal products (331-332),
Primary and fabricated metal industries (33-34), Chemical (325),
Wholesale trade (50-51) Wholesale trade (42)
20. Industrials Primary and fabricated metal industries (33-34), Primary and fabricated metal products (331-332),
Industrial machinery and equipment (35), Machinery (333),
Electronic and other electric equipment (36), Computers and electronic products (334),
Transportation equipment (37) Electrical equipment, appliances and components (335),
Transportation equipment (336)
25. C. DiscretionaryElectronic and other electric equipment (36), Transportation equipment (336),
Transportation equipment (37), Miscellaneous (339),
Services (70-89) Information (51),
Professional, scientific, and technical services (54)
30. C. Staples Food and kindred products (20), Food (311),
Chemicals and allied products (28), Chemical (325),
Wholesale Trade (50-51) Wholesale Trade (42)
35. Health Care Chemicals and allied products (28), Chemical (325),
Electronic and other electric equipment (36), Computers and electronic products (334),
Wholesale trade (50-51) Miscellaneous (339),
Wholesale trade (42)
40. Financials Financial, insurance, and real estate industries (61-67), Finance and insurance (52),
Depository institutions (60) Depository institutions (60)
45. IT Industrial machinery and equipment (35), Computers and electronic products (334),
Electronic and other electric equipment (36), Information (51),
Services (70-89) Professional, scientific, and technical services (54)
50. Telecom Information (51)
The table displays the mapping of SIC/NAICS sectors to GICS sectors, based on classifi-
cations of current and historic S&P500 companies obtained from Compustat.
50
